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The Spirit of the Nation
T. VAIL PALMER, JR.
“For God and country” — is this just a popular slogan,
or does it represent something more far-reaching? Has the
nation itself become a god — or even God? Is this God still
a living reality — or is He dead? What implications do these
questions have for the future of the Christian faith?
To deal with these issues, we need to develop a style of
prophetic historical analysis of the powers at work in society.
By discerning how and where God is at work, the church can
better know where and when it should act. Would such a
prophetic social-historical analysis actually confirm the wide
spread belief that the nation is one of the most fundamental
and effective social units in our world, and its corollary, that
we should look to the organs of the national government as
hearers and executors of the basic moral values of’ our society?
J.f so, then presumably the church’s mission should include a
large (lose of lobbying and work in electoral politics, in order
to assure that Christian values are actually put into practice
in the policies and acts of the national government.
A Christian prophetic analysis of society would, presum
ably, find its source in the Bible — in the insights of biblical
writers and in the biblical understanding of human history and
society. In our modern age, however, most of us are inclined
to discount the Bible as a possible supplement or alternative
to scientific methods in telling us about the nature of our
physical or social environment. Certainly, the church has
committed grave errors and lost much influence, in its attempts
to use the Bible too simply and directly as a textbook in astron
omy or biology — or even in objective history!
Yet, as we look today at the social and psychological
sciences, in particular, the question cannot escape us: How far
can we get, through purely “objective” analysis and research?
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1Even mathematics anti logic have to start out with a few
unproved assumptions; the number of these postulates increases
greatly as we get into more omplex fields like the social
sciences. There is a similar increase in the number of compet
ing ‘‘schools of thought” which base their respective analyses
on conflicting sets of postulates. In any particular school in
the social sciences, these postulates are likely to be based, con
sciously or otherwise, on the scientist’s underlying system of
values. In the nature of the case, these values cannot them
selves be established by objective, “scientific’’ methods. Just at
this point, therefore, the Christian would do well to look to
biblical revelation as the source for his basic system of values
amid of his otherwise unprovable postulates about the nature
of man and of society, around which he can organize the
infoinia tion provided by his empirical observations.
A decision to approach the study of the nature of society
from a biblical perspective will of necessity require the rejec
tion of one very popular and influential contemporary approach
to biblical interpretation: namely, Bultmann’s program of
“de-mythologization.’’ Bultnsann points out that the thought-
world — the basic pattern of intellectual assumptions — of the
biblical writers was ‘‘mythological.” The thought-world of
modern man is scientific. Mythological thinking will no longer
do. Therefore we must strip away everything in the Bible that
depends on the mythological world-view and that is incom
patible with the scientific outlook. The core that is left —
faith, love, obedient freedom, responsibility — is the Christian
message. This is all that we can responsibly derive from the
Bible, for guidance in contemporary life.
Bultmann, clearly, takes the world-view of contemporary
man as normative for theology. Peter Berger, from the stand
point of one of the most contemporary of scientific disciplines,
the sociology of knowledge, points out the fatal Ilaw in Bult
mann’s approach: it is based on
a hidden double standard: ... The past, out of
which the tradition comes, is relativizech in terms
of this or that socio-historical analysis. The present,
however, remains strangely immune from relativi
ration. . . . The New Testament writers are seen
4
as afflicted with a false consciousness rooted in
their time, but the contemporary analyst takes the
consciousness of his time as an unmixed intel
lectual blessing.
The perspective of... the sociology of knowl
edge can have a definitely liberating effect. While
other analytic disciplines free us from the dead
weight of the past, sociology frees us from the
t)ranny of the present The Perspective of
sociology increases our ability to investigate what
ever truth each age may have discovered in its
particular “immediacy to God.”1
In particular, Bultmanu’s approach is far too contemptu
ous of mythological thinking. Modern man — even the modern
Christian -— probably does find it hard to think in mythological
terms. But he is the poorer — not the richer — for this diffi
culty. As Amos Wilder has pointed out: “The world’s greatest
myths have always been summary anti symbolic representations
ol essential truths A myth . . . carries a weight of spiritual
Eruth such as only tIne greatest art can convey.’’2 Rather than
‘dc-mythologize” he Bible, then, we would do far better to
‘re-niythologize” our own understanding of life! At least
some of the myths underlying biblical thought may have the
power to titi ow new and unsuspected light on our understand
ing of ourselves and our environment.
Any attempt 1.0 view the nation-state from a biblical per
spective can hardly avoid taking Romans 13 seriously into
account. Oscar Cullmnann and Clinton Morrison, in particular,
have thrown considerable light on the “mythological’’ world-
view which underlies Paul’s thought in Romans 13.
New Testament scholars today generally agree that the
exousja (“authorities” or “powers”), in such passages as Ephe
sians 3:10 and 6:12, Colossjans i:16 and 2:15, 1 Peter 3:22, and
I Corinthians 15:24, are invisible, spiritual beings, such as
angels or demons. Cullmann argues that these same spiritual
powers are referred to in Romans 13, where the word exousiaj
means both those beings and ordinary governments and king
doms on earth. Behind the complex structure of power in
human society, the New Testament thus portrays a vast inter
play of conflict among powerful spiritual forces or beings,
5
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whose activity is reflected in the confused affairs of social
institutions and human power structures.
It is, of course, difficult today to picture the world as full
of invisible powers, spiritual hosts, and angels. But we should
note that man is, after all, a religious being. He is forever
seeking a reality to which he can fully commit himself, a
being real, great, anti awesome enough, yet warm enough for
him to worship with everything he has — his wealth, his self-
interest, his family attachments, even his life. And since man
is also a social being, he can find full satisfaction only at the
center of social groups and institutions, with which he can
identify himself antI feel a full sense of “belonging.” There is
a great tendency for these two drives to merge with each other.
indeed, the claim of both the Old and the New Testaments,
which is exemplifietl in the histories of both Israel antI the
Christian church, is that when men worship the true God they
find themselves drawn, through this religious loyalty, into a
‘people of God,” which provides them with a sense of
“corporate personality.” But often this sense of belonging is
provided by less inclusive social groups or institutions, which
claim to embody some great values to which men can give
their ultimate loyalty. Thus social institutions can, in actual
fact, become the embodiments and instruments of great spiri
tual forces, which can powerfully move and influence men and
communities — the forces of “philosophy and empty deceit,
according to human tradition, according to the elemental
spirits of the universe.” (Colossians 2:8)
The object of ultimate devotion to which people give
themselves plays an essential role in motivating them and
determining the nature and direction of the most important
deeds of their lives. The purposes of the exousiar, the spiritual
powers and authorities, thus exercise a sway over and beyond
the independent purposes of men and groups. These “spir
itual” purposes operate through groups and institutions and
through the quasi-religious loyalties which are expressed in the
adherence of their members to the “ideals” and values for
which the groups stand. People often submerge their own
interests in purposes which are “above” the aggregate self-
interest of all the members of the group, even though these
higher purposes may stop short of — or conflict with — the
highest and most inclusive irpose in the universe.
Clearly, then, the church must understand the deeper
implications of the forces at work in society and in historical
events. We need to supplement our scientific and rational
posvers of observation and thought, with a form of insight
which might well be termed “the ability to distinguish between
spirits” (I Corinthians 12:10). There need to be persons in
the Christian community who have the gift of seeing beyond
even the conscious and subconscious purposes of men in their
actions. There must be Christians who can see which of the
spiritual powers, whose activity is involved in the course of
Heilsgeschichte, is actually advancing through the deeds and
arguments of men in their social antI political activities. This
distinguishing between spirits” is a form of ‘‘prophetic histor
ical analysis’’ which would be particularly appropriate to a
study of the role of the nation in contemporary society.
One of the spiritual powers or exousiai most evidently at
large in the contemporary world is the spirit of nationalism.
The rise of this spirit has paralleled the decline of the influ
ence of the Christian faith in the western world. In this essay
I shall draw on interpretations already made by such scholars
as James Hastings Nichols, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Will
Herbrg, for “raw material” in my attempt to trace the careers
of the Christians’ God and of the spirit of nationalism in the
modern WTest.
The late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries can be
characterized as the “Confessional period” in Europe. Each
confession was convinced that it alone possessed the Truth.
All other confessions were in error. No Christian confession,
therefore, could see any justification for the existence of the
others. In practical terms, this attitude made religious war-
are almost inevitable. And for two or three generations, the
history of Europe was characterized by almost chronic religious
wars — especially the French Wars of Religion, the Thirty
Years War in Germany, and the English Civil War. Each
of these wars, of course, was fought on both sides in the name
of Christianity.3
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1These wars were sO savagely fought, and the devastation
that iesiiltecl was so great, CSC( ially in Germany, that a
tremendous emotional revulsion had set in by the last quarter
of the seventeenth century. This revulsion was l)lrti(;t11trly
directed against the exclusive dogmatism that had undergirded
the wars. People had become tired to death of dogmatic
theology and of its political consequences. Christian Europe
settled down to accepting the three or four major religious
divisions, winch apparently had to co-exist.
Foe most European villagers, of course, no great adjust
ment of outlook was reqiured at first. The intellectual horizon
was limited to one’s own village and the surrounding farms.
In IhaL area, there was oniy one church; its teachings were,
without question, the ‘truth. The situation was different for
the leaders of society. Businessmen, soldiers, and highly edu
cated pe1o had become aware that elsewhere, beyond their
own villages -ncl towns, there were other men who did not
accept their own formulations of Christianity. Yet they were
acquainted with these other persons, who clearly were fellow
humans and eveit seemed to be decent persons. Thus a sense
of common humanity began to develop across church barriers.
People began to compare various religious faiths and ethical
standards. The increasing awareness of alternative formula
tions, in faith and ethics, led to a growth of skepticism about
time teachirmg.s of the official spokesmen of one’s own church.
For the first lime, traditional church authority (IS such was
being questioned on a substantial scale. Individuals increas
ingly wanted to emphasize the common beliefs — God, objective
morality, arid justice — which seemed to be shared by all
humans, whatever their confessional background. More and
more, the thinking laity tended to believe in a kind of
“common-sense,” least-common-den omnina tor religion. The feel
ing even grew that specific, positive religious beliefs can be
actively immoral. Was it not theological orthodoxy which had
led to such atrocious crimes as torture, burning at the stake,
and religious wars? ‘there was also a growing sense that
specific areas of common life — politics, economic life, natural
science — possessed their own intrinsic right to solve their own
8
problems, without theological dictation by the churches. This
attitude was particularly strengthened by the tremendous
growth of the physical sciences. it was an age of great scie[i
tific geniuses, who attained new knowledge through empirical
observation and the exercise of their natural reason. The
successes of science led to the increasing prestige of human
reason and the conviction that reason should also be applied
in human affairs.
By the eighteenth century, a new scientific view of the
Universe was gaining headway. The discoveries, for instance,
of isaac Newton were being popularized by thinkers like Vol
taire. in contrast with the old semi-biblical, semi-Aristotelian
teleological understanding of the natural universe, a new,
mechanical view of nature was becoming the guiding image
for popular thought. The mechanistic physics, which excluded
all ideas of purpose, was proving to be a powerful tool for
increasing man’s understanding of natural processes. From this
viewpoint, which looked on the universe as an enormous
“machine,” biblical language about the world seemed fantastic,
nnraculous, incredible. Even though most of the great
scientists, including Newton, were themselves Christians, their
discoveries were creating all sorts of intellectual problems for
C lu-is tians.
Even more upsetting than the new physics was a new
political faith. Typical leaders of Enlightenment thought were
tIme ‘plmilosophes — thinkers like Voltaire, Rousseau, Lessing,
Franklin, and Jefferson. These thinkers denied many funda
mental Christian affirmations — sin, human depravity, the
incarnation of ultimate meaning in one historical person, a
personal God, miracles, the chosen people, the second coming
of Christ. But the philosophes were not prinarily critical
philosophers. They were not even consistent mechanists — at
least in their view of history. They were primarily prophets,
reformers, crusaders, enthusiasts, “ersatz theologians.” They
proposed for Western man a new, “enlightened” faith to live
by. They saw themselves as an emancipated, enlightened, inter
national company of cosmopolitan members of the human race.
They had a great faith in reason and in the perfectibility of
j
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the human race. F{istory did have a meaning and a purpose.
A kind of “secular eschatology” — the idea of progress —
emerged as a key feature of their thinking. if they denied a
last judgment by Jesus Christ, they did trust their actions to a
later judgment by “posterity.” If they denied the old picture
of a New Jerusalem at the end of the age, they were convinced
that history was progressing toward an ideal social order
within history — “a kind of bourgeois heaven.”
By the latter half of the eighteenth century, the idea of
progress was becoming more and more intensifIed. Enlighten
ment mcii were cxpecting an impending climax; they were
hoping for an imminent fulfillment of their social dreams.
This climax soon arrived — in the French Revolution — a
revolution based on a “religion of humanity,” complete with
its own martyrs, saints, and festival clays. In the French
Revolution, Reason was even put forth as a new goddess to
lead the people.
But the new Enlightenment faith in reason and human
goodness was already being undermined from within. A lead
ing jhilosophe, Diderot, was moving toward a deterministic
psychology — which left no room for any distinctions between
right and wrong. Even more seriously, a rigorous philosopher,
David Hume, was demonstrating, on the Enlightenment’s own
premises, that reason is not competent to answer the major
questions of life. There was no rational proof of deity, pur
pose, or morality. When the scientific method was consistently
applied to human concerns, it undercut the ethical assumptions
of thc philosophes. With Hume, faith in reason turned into
an ultimate skepticism. Even the scientific method itself was
shown to have no underlying rational justification. Reason was,
in any case, too impersonal a spirit to capture the warm,
passionate loyalty of many people for long. Now it had proved
to be too frail a ghost even to carry its own weight. Christianity
had been rejected; Reason had disintegrated. What god was
left?
A new god was waiting in the wings, to make its dramatic
entry onto the world’s stage during the French Revolution. For
many centuries, this god had been laying the groundwork for
10
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its ultimate triumph. It had lost an early skirmish when
Henry II did penance at Becket’s tomb in 1174. It had grown
strong enough to defy successfully the claims of the papacy,
when Philip the Fair imprisoned Boniface VIII in 1303. It was
an important ally of 1-luss’ reform in the fifteenth century and
of Luther’s in the sixteenth. But even then, the spirit of the
nation hatE been only a supporting actor on the stage of world
history. Nationalism, aS a significant, primary force, first came
forth to center stage at the time of the French Revolution.
Only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has nationalism
become the dominant religion of the masses in Western
civilization.
At the rime of the French Revolution, the Third Estate
declared that they were the people — and the people should
rule. The concept of popular sovereignty was asserted, against
the old hierarchical concept of government. In principle, all
were included as l)articipants in the nation. French
nationalism was founded on a covenant, consciously celebrated
in 1790, when “in every commune . . . the oath to la patric
was taken, often around an open-air altar.”4 The spirit of the
nation was personified in Marianne (to be followed by such
divinities as John Bull and Uncle Sam). “The people”
became a collective personality, a true mystical body.
The national state, of course, had already developed
unprecedented power in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen
turies, and had largely superseded the old centers of power —
religious authorities, the emperor, the feudal nobility. But this
power was largely imposed on the people by absolute monarchs.
The new characteristic of national power, which emerged at
the end of the eighteenth century, was a widespread and deep-
seated sense, among the people, of participation in government
anti national life. This nationalistic spirit rapidly established
institutional means for perpetuating itself. The public school
system was first set up in France as a device of the Enlighten
ment. The hope had been to get education away from the
priests antI thus to outflank the church by raising an “enlight
ened” generation of the nation’s youth. This public school
system was readily transformed into a means of training
11
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1chilclrc.n iii devotion to the fatherland. In many nations, this
public education has been made universal and compulsory;
an(I the school system is held accountable for any slips or
deviations from the national cult. Many religious devices and
1)ractices have been borrowed Irons Christianity — shrines,
saints, altars, hymns and anthems, hoiy clays, rituals, the flag,
censorship. Among the professions, journalism and history
have particularly become agents of nationalism.
The spirit o[ nationalism spread rapidly from France
through Europe and America in the nineteenth century, and
on through Asia an(i Africa in the twentieth century. With
nationalism came a great increase in time exercise of personal
responsibility in society. Nationalism brought to men anti
women a new sense of dignity, exaltation, anti fulfillment,
beyond the spheres of private and family or clan life. Even in
recent decades, nationalism has been primarily a releasing
force in Asia and Africa.
Nationalism was not the only new religion to emerge in
Europe. From the early days of the Reformation, as Weber
and others have pointed out, there was a close alliance between
Protestantisnc and the emerging capitalist economic structure.
This alliance was only strengthened with the coming of the
Industrial Revolution. By the middle of the nineteenth cen
tiny, especially in central Europe, Protestantism in pai’ticular
had become identified as the religion of the bourgeoisie, of
the wielders of economic and political power. The rapidly
growing class of industrial workers was forced by economic
necessity into hostility toward the owners of industry. Not
surprisingly, they were increasingly alienated from, and hostile
to, Christianity. They were more and more turning toward
some form of socialism or communism as an answer to their
misery. Marx anti Engels could thus write in 1848: “A spectre
is haunting Europe — the spectre of Communism.”5
With prophetic fervor, Marx formulated a version of
communism that claimed scientific objectivity for itself. Thus
undergirched with a respctable philosophical foundation,
Marxist socialism had become a formidable political force in
Europe by the end of the nineteenth century. It also served
as a religious substitute for the discredited Christianity, among
many in the working classes. Marx had proclaimed that the
interests of the working classes were international in scope;
not a parochial nation but the world-wide proletariat was the
bearer of historical destiny. He had sounded his challenge:
“Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution.
The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They
have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite!”6
And the workers were uniting in a grand Socialist Inter
national which had great hopes of gaining its triumph in
Europe through the very parliamentary processes that now
afforded the bourgeoisie their political control of the nations
of Europe.
The fatal weakness of socialist internationalism was
revealed, however, in the fateful days when World War I broke
out in a largely unsuspecting Europe. The Socialist parties in
each nation listened to
—
and believed the self-justifications
of their respective national governments, and stampeded into
line behind the national war efforts. The Socialist Inter
national was completely shattered. In the council of the gods,
Vaterland had emergeci completely victorious from his struggle
with the Dialectic of History.
One of the lust to see antI condemn this betrayal of social
ism to the nationalist spirit was Lenin. He returned to his
native Russia and presided over a rebirth of socialism, purged
of its alliance with nationalism, in the Russian Revolution
of 1917.
The nation, for all of its strengths and triumphs, does
have one obvious failing as a god. It simply is not supreme
and all-pow’erful; it is only one of many such gods, all corn
peting for first place on Mt. Olympus. Such parochial and
local gods have, throughout history, had a notorious tendency
to succumb anti disappear in any contest with a more univer
salist faith.
Why has nationalism, then, proved so successful in its
encounters with such universalist rivals as Christianity, the
Enlightenment, and Socialism? Part of the explanation, at
least, has been nationalism’s enormous capacity for syncretism.
I
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Ar the outset, in the early nineteenth century, most nation
alists still affirmed the Enlightenment faith in common human
ity. They were conFident that, once the old aristocratic and
royal rulers were swept away, the bonds of universality and of
peace would be strengthened. Once the people were liberated
and were in charge, they would readily recognize that in all
nations they were inspired by the same universal ideals of
[reedom, tolerance, and peace. Thus all peoples would pursue
their national destinies in harmony with one another.
But the Enlightenment had run its course. The reality
turned out to be far different from the promise. The spirit
of nationalism, once victorious, proved to be exclusive and
intolerant. National jealousies were now far stronger and more
deep-seated than the old rivalries among the princes.
Many people, o[ course, were uneasy in conscience. They
still had memories of the universal moralities preached by
Christianity and by the Enlightenment. The nationalist spirit
could not have prevailed, had it not found an escape for such
uneasy consciences. In the twentieth century, a few of the
great nations have solved this problem by identifying them
selves with great ethical principles or sets of values, which can
claim to be universally valid. Men recognized that their own
nations stood for such great principles as liberty, equality,
justice, or fraternity. It was not difficult to jump to the
conclusion that one’s own nation possessed the true morality,
which all men should follow. Each particular nation claims
that its own values should be universally recognized. The
other nations are wrong; hence their ethical systems should be
suppressed. The situation is strangely parallel to that of the
confessional states of the early seventeenth century:
Nations no longer oppose each other. . . within
a framework of shared beliefs and common values,
which imposes effective limitations upon the ends
and means of their struggle for power. They
oppose each other now as the standard-bearers of
ethical systems, each of them of national origin
and each of them claiming and aspiring to pro
vide a supranational framework of moral stand-
arcls which all the other nations ought to accept
and within which their foreign policies ought to
operate. The moral code of one nation flings the
challenge of its universal claim into the face of
another, which reciprocates in kind. . .
. The stage
is set for a contest among nations whose stakes are
• .
. the ability to impose upon the other contes
tants a new universal political and moral system
recreated in the image of the victorious nation’s
political and moral convictions.
Lenin had set out to l)ujldl a non-nationalistic communism
in Russia. But his dream was rapidly transformed. By the
nineteen-thirties, Communist parties throughout the world had
already been reduced to the status of pawns for Russian foreign
policy. The real resurgence of Russian nationalism, however,
came during ‘World WTar II, when the deep penetration of
Russia by German armies aroused and united the Russian
people in a reawakened national fervor. At the end of the
war, this nationalist spirit, now identified with the idealism
of communist morality, expressed itself in the establishment
of Communist regimes by Russian arms throughout eastern
Europe and in Russian support for successful Communist
revolutions in the Far East.
An even more remarkable synthesis of nationalism with
democratic values and Judo-Christiari religion has come to
fruition in the United States of America. More and more in
recent decades, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews have come to
think of themselves as simply three varieties of one true
religion. All three major groups tend to identify the basic
common faith, which they share, with the “American way of
life” and the spiritual values of democracy. This “religion
of America” is identified with “democracy in a peculiarly
American sense — . .
. individualistic, dynamic, pragmatic,
humanitarian, ‘for’i’ard looking’, optimistic.8
By and large, the “common faith” of American
society remains implicit... By the great mass of
the American people the American Way of Life
operates as a “common faith”.., through its
pervasive influence on the patterns of American
thought and feeling. It makes no pretensions to
14 15
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override or supplant the recognized religions, to
which it assigns a place of great eminence and
honor in the American scheme of things. But all
the implications are there.°
The contemporary triumph of this “nationalistic univer
salism’ can be seen in such diverse developments as Woodrow
Wilson’s crusade to “make the world safe for democracy,”
Maoist China’s claim to be time “vanguard of the revolution,”
and even the claim of the Na7is to possess a new moral code
[or the whole world, superior to vicious bolshevism and deca
(lent democracy. Time most powerful nations in the world
have become missionaries for the values which they profess;
aiicl they of course claim to incarnate these values in their
own internal structures. Thus have the nations in this century
successfully asserted their claim to the religious loyalties of
men. Ea(h major nation now has a whole “way of life” at
stake in the international struggle. International politics has,
in effect, become the staging ground for the contests between
rival gods:
However munch the content and objectives of
today’s ethics of nationalistic universalism may
djlfer from those of pmitie tribes or of the
Thirty Years’ War, they do not differ in the func
tion they fulfill for international politics, and in
the moral c]imate they create. . . . Thus, carrying
their idols before them, the nationalistic masses
of our time meet in the international arena, each
group convinced that it executes the mandate of
history, that it does for humanity what it seems to
do for itself, and that it fulfills a sacred mission
ordamed by Providence, however defined.’0
In three centuries, Western civilization appears to have
come lull circle, back to a situation strikingly similar to that
of time Confessional period. Again, states stand for competing
versions of the ultimate truth. Each “confession” alone pos
sesses the truth, and cannot tolerate the existence of its rivals.
Warfare has again attained a level of savagery, an inclusive
ness of scope, and a degree of devastation comparable with
that of the great wars of religion, and far exceeding that of
warfare in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Clearly the syimcretisnm with nationalism must be an uneasy
one [or any international, universalist religion — be it Christi
aility, Communism, Buddhism, or Islam. If any of these
religions retains any vitality of its own, the future of the 5)11-
thesis must be in question. Morgenthau concluded his passage
on the meeting of the nationalistic masses of our time in the
international arena with the cryptic comment: “Little do they
know that they meet under an empty sky from which the gods
have departed.”11 Is there any sign that the peoples may
realize that “the gods have departed”? Nichols concluded his
account of nationalism as a new religion with the question:
Will these wars result as did the Christians’ religious wars,
in a similar reaction. and weariness against the current ortho
doxy. in a ‘new enlightenment’?”1’
Nichols asked his question in 1958. A dozen years later,
there is some evidence that the reaction may he well under
way. In the United States, the breaking-point seems to have
come as a consequence of the contradictions involved in the
Vietnam war. Since Communism is the chief rival of the
American Way of Life, it has been readily identified as the
source of evil in today’s world. At the very least,
any attempt by Conununism to win new adherents must be
resisted to the death. This attitude has necessarily dictated
American intervention in Vietnam, since Communism was
clearly threatening to spread southward in that land. On the
other hand, a primary value affirmed in the American creed
is “freedom,” interpreted to mean self-determination — for
individuals and for such primary social units as families,
business enterprises, and nations. To informed Americans,
however, it has become increasingly clear that genuine self
determination in Vietnam might well mean that that nation
would choose to “go Communist.” American intervention in
South Vietnam has thus been recognized as — potentially and
perhaps even actually — the primary adversary of “freedom”
in that land, as Americans have understood the term.
Most of American society has been able to ignore the
dilemma, simply by refusing to admit the possibility that any
people could conceivably want to be Communist. The aca
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1clemic community in America, however, has sufficiently valued
the ideal of openness to objective evidence, that it has had to
lace up to the facts of the situation. The result has been an
agonizing recognition that the very premises of tile American
national ideal are mutually inconsistent.
‘This result has been especially dramatic among students.
Having invested less of their lives already in commitment to
the American Way of Life, they have been freer to reject that
religion outright than have most older members of the aca
demic community. Elhus the amazingly widespread student
protests against the Vietnam war have taken place in an
even snore far-reaching context: a style-of-life that deliberately
dramatizes a wholesale rejection of the American Way of Life
—
at least as that Way has worked out in historical reality. For
the student radicals, God truly is dead — but not in the sense
intended by Altizer and Hamilton. The god whose death is
now being announced is not the God whose obituary Nietzsche
pronounced. ft is the exonsza of American nationalistic uni
versalism, the Author of this country’s “manifest destiny,” who
has died — at least to the younger portion of the intellectual
community.
Pmfssor Federico Mancini, of the University of Bologna,
confirms in his description of the Italian student movement
that these developments are not limited to the American scene:
Even its intolerance, its violence have something
in common with the intolerance of the philo
.sophes who paved the way for the Revolution in
the 18th century. The “burn, baby, burn” of
the students has obviously been borrowed from
the American Blacks; but, to me, yelled as it is
by cultivated and rather privileged youths, it has
much the same ring as the “Ecrasez i’m fame” of
Voltaire. . . . The new radicalism . . . is, in fact,
more akin than one generally recognizes to the
very old radicalism of the Enlightenment.’3
In light of the analysis which I have developed here, the
place of critical decision today is not in ‘Washington, but on
the university campuses. The student movement is clear in
what it is rejecting; it does not yet know where it is going.
18
The only available ideology of protest has been Marxism; but
Marxism is as fundamentally compromised with the demon of
nationalism as are Christianity and democracy. There is a
widespread religious groping, an experimentation with every
thing from witchcraft to the I Ching. A god has died; the
search is on for his successor, but the new god has not yet
revealed himself.
If there is any hope for Christian renewal, if “through the
church tile manifold wisdom of God might now be made
known to the principalities and exomtsiai in tile heavenly
places” (Ephesians 3:10), a crucial locus today for this revela
tion must be an active encounter with the student radicals.
At the very least, an honest, prophetic church should be able
to recognize that the Christian faith is not identical with the
American “religion of democracy” and thus able to meet the
radicals on their own terms, in a mutual quest for a religious
understanding and commitment adequate to our times.
I
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